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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
according to its own circumstances, and a decrease in the probative value of the
testimony in question or a clearer showing that it was used to incite the prejudice
of the jury, could easily result in reversal
Violation Of Local Traffic Ordinance-Evidence Of Negligence
New York City traffic regulations 2 establish a right of way in favor
of pedestrians over automobile drivers at crossings not protected by a police
officer or a traffic light. In Taggart v. Vogel,63 plaintiff was struck by de-
fendant's automobile while crossing at such an intersection. The Court of
Appeals held (6-1) that the refusal of the trial judge to charge these regulations
and his instructions to apply the same standard of care to both parties amounted
to reversable error. The Court stated that the above regulations increased the
responsibility of drivers, and a violation amounted to some evidence of negligence.
The effect which the Court gives to local traffic regulations in this case
tacitly reaffirms the established principle that although the violation of a local
ordinance will not amount to negligance per se,64 it is relevant as amounting to
some evidence of negligence on the part of the violator.65
Negligence-Question Of Fact
In Levine v. City of New York,60 the Court was faced with the problem of
determining whether the referee or the Appellate Division 7 made the appropriate
findings of facr.0s It held in agreement with the referee that it was more
probable than not that the defendant was negligent. Judgment was therefore
entered in favor of the plaintiff on the reinstated referee's report. This conclusion,
because it involves only a factual appraisal, leaves no room for comment.0 9
Negligence-Incidental Injuries
Zipprich v. Smith Trucking Company and Creaser v. Smith Trucking
Company,70 personal injury actions arising out of the same accident, were tried
62. NEW YORK CITY TRAFFIC REGULATIONS §77.
63. 3 N.Y.2d 58, 163 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1957).
64. Fluker v. Ziegele Brewing Co., 201 N.Y. 40, 93 N.E. 1112 (1911).
65. Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935).
66. 2 N.Y.2d 246, 159 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1957).
67. 1 A.D.2d 661, 147 N.Y.S.2d 684 (1st Dept 1955).
68. Section 605 of the Civil Practice Act compels the Court of Appeals to
review findings of fact when the Appellate Division finds new facts In modifying
or reversing the trial court.
69. For an interesting discussion of this case on a prior appeal, 309 N.Y. 88,
127 N.E.2d 825 (1955), see 5 BUFFALO L. REv. 240 (1956), wherein the writer asserts
that the Court strained to allow recovery under the guise of the Invitee theory
when really applying the attractive nuisance doctrine which is not acceptable In
the New York courts.
70. 2 N.Y.2d 177, 157 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1956).
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together. After the liability of the defendant was clearly established in the first
instance and affirmed by the Appellate Division,71 the defendant objected to the
verdict on the grounds, inter alia, that the charges to the jury concerning a
private investigator were prejudicial error, and that certain evidence concerning
injuries sustained by Creaser was not admissable.
The Court of Appeals,72 in a brief decision, determined all the objections
in favor of the plaintiff. On one point, the admissability of evidence in the
Creaser case,73 two judges dissented.
The Court determined that the lower court's charges concerning the private
investigator were proper since the interest of the investigator whose compensation
depended upon the production of favorable evidence for his client should be
considered by the jury along with all other factors in determining the witness'
credibility. The private interest of investigators can be brought out in evidence,74
and the jury may consider the fact that the witness was paid for his services. 75
However it would have been error to instruct the jury that the testimony of
private detectives should be looked upon with suspicion and distrust.7G
The Creaser case77 presented the only real problem for the Court. As the
result of the accident, plaintiff suffered a weakened ankle and a fifty per cent
limitation of arm and shoulder motion, and while walking to the doctor's office,
he fell, sustaining a fracture of the arm. Evidence objected to was to the effect
that the injury of the original accident was the proximate cause of the later
accident. The lower court in admitting this evidence allowed the jury to consider
both injuries in determining the amount of damages. It was held in Wagner v.
Mitendorf78 that added injuries may be included in damages provided a sufficient
causal connection can be established indicating that they arose out of the first
injury. This was substantially the law previous to this decision 9 and it stands
unchallenged today even by the dissent in the present case. The basis of contention
here is whether the causal connection between the injuries was sufficient. The
correctness of the Court's decision that the weakened ankle and damaged arm
and shoulder proximately caused the fall is open to question. The dissent's
71. 1 A.D.2d 756, 148 N.Y.S.2d 924 (4th Dep't 1955;.
72. See note 70 supra.
73. Creaser v. Smith Trucking Company, note 70 supra.
74. Wood v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 257 App. Div. 172, 12
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1st Dep't 1939), aff'd 281 N.Y. 797, 24 N.E.2d 480 (1939).
75. Schwartz v. Prudential Insurance Co., 259 App. Div. 1052, 21 N.Y.S.2d 68
(2d Dep't 1940).
76. Ibid.
77. Creaser v. Smith Trucking Company, note 70 supra.
78. 232 N.Y. 481, 134 N.E. 539 (1922).
79. Matter of Phillips v. Holmes Express Co., 190 App. Div. 336, 179 N.Y.
Supp. 400 (3rd Dep't 1919), aff'd mem., 229 N.Y. 527, 129 N.E. 902 (1920).
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opinion that any connection was merely speculative seems, on the basis of the
record presented, to be more accurate.
This Court goes further in this case than in any previous similar one in
upholding the presence of a sufficient causal connection.80 As a result, future
claimants will probably find it easier to prove causal connection and, thus, may
recover greater amounts of damages.
Tortfeasors In Pari Delicto-No Indemnification
The problem of indemnification between joint tortfeasors was recently
considered in the case of Harrington v. 615 West Corp.81 In this case a tenant
recovered a judgment against her landlord and a painting contractor engaged by
said landlord, when she tripped over a rope laid by the contractor while on her
way to a clothesline maintained for the convenience of the tenants. The Court of
Appeals, affirming trial term, dismissed the landlord's cross complaint against
the contractor for indemnification, after it had been reinstated by the Appellate
Division.s2
The crucial problem involved in the present appeal concerns the right of
indemnification as between the co-defendants. Clearly the weight of authority
in this jurisdiction recognizes the right of recovery of a passive wrongdoer over
against a primary, active wrongdoer whose misconduct created the dangerous
condition.8 3  It then becomes necessary, once the joint delinquency of the
defendants has been established, that the dealings between the parties be observed
so as to ascertain whether their negligence is active or passive.8 4 This Court in
approaching the problem held that the negligence of both defendants lies solely
in their failure to take proper precautions as to the danger created by the rope,
with the knowledge of each that the rope was there and that tenants were
accustomed to pass that way. Consequently the negligence of each co-defendant
was active; thus barring any application of the rule of indemnification as between
active and passive wrongdoes s 5
The dissent, relying on the opinion of the Appellate Division, contended
that the act of the painting contractor in placing the rope without the proper
80. Ibid.; Brooks v. Rochester Railroad Co., 156 N.Y. 244, 50 N.E. 945 (1898);
Wilker v. State, 284 App. Div. 996, 135 N.Y.S.2d 342 (3rd Dep't 1954); Avesato v.
Paul Tishman Co., 142 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
81. Harrington v. 615 West Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 476, 161 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1957).
82. 1 A.D.2d 435, 151 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1st Dep't 1956).
83. Hyman v. Barrett, 224 N.Y. 436, 121 N.E. 271 (1918); Tipaldi v. Riverside
Mem. Chapel, 298 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E.2d 585 (1948).
84. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 464
(1952).
85. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Compagnia, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892).
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